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The Canadian War Museum was its country’s first national history 
museum, but also one of the most 
neglected of federal institutions. Its 
usual fate was pedestrian quarters, 
meagre financial resources, and a 
miniscule staff. Canada, after all, 
styled itself as the very opposite 
of a warrior society. Governments 
promoted an official brand of 
nationalism that obliterated the 
internal divisions and dilemmas that 
Canada’s wars exposed.1 Their project 
succeeded, and not simply with 
Canadians. One visitor to Ottawa, 
a museum scholar from California, 
was astonished by the very idea of a 
Canadian War Museum. The image 
of Canada that rushed to her mind 
was that of the cartoon Mountie 
Dudley Do-Right, not of a country 
with a long pedigree of military 
service and distinction.2 
 Yet a magnificent new Canadian 
War Museum building rose up in 
the national capital during the first 
years of the twenty-first century. 
The renaissance of the war museum 
was the result of an extraordinary 
alchemy of events and impulses that 
challenges the notion of Canadians 
as an unmilitary people. 
 Military conflict and military 
endeavour are woven into the 
national fibre,3 but post-Second 
World War Canadians constructed 
an understanding of themselves that 
made it easy to overlook the pivotal 
role of warfare in the definition 
of their country. Modern Canada 
began to see itself, and ostentatiously 
describe itself, as cosmopolitan, 
progressive, tolerant, generous – and 
peaceful. The military personnel who 
caught the national imagination were 
Canada’s peacekeepers, who became 
the leading international practitioners 
of the craft. The country’s foreign 
minister, L. B. Pearson, won the 1957 
Nobel Peace Prize for the diplomacy 
that had solved the Suez Crisis 
(and “saved the world,” in the 
words of the Nobel Committee) 
with the expedient of a Middle East 
peacekeeping force. Although it 
wasn’t true, Pearson got credit for 
having invented peacekeeping, and 
politicians for decades after tried to 
repeat his success. There was hardly 
a peacekeeping mission in the second 
half of the twentieth century that did 
not have Canadian participation.4 
 Peacekeeping might constitute a 
very small part of the defence budget, 
but it bulked very large in the public 
and official mind. Peacekeeping 
became indelibly Canadian as national 
interests, ideals, and expectations 
combined, accumulated, and took 
firm hold. With peacekeeping came 
the conviction that other countries 
waged war, and that a superbly, 
supremely moral Canada cleaned 
up their messes. The world needed 
Canada, the belief went, just as 
Canada needed the world.5
 The peacekeepers of the United 
Nations were given the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1988, an award that 
Canadians promptly appropriated 
to themselves. Two years later the 
government of Canada decided to 
erect a peacekeeping monument 
to reflect “a dramatic shift in the 
role and purpose of the Canadian 
Armed Forces” and to represent “a 
fundamental Canadian value: no 
missionary zeal to impose our way 
of life on others but an acceptance 
of the responsibility to assist them 
in determining their own futures 
by ensuring a non-violent climate 
Abstract: Late in the twentieth 
century, intent on a new vision and 
new building for their museum, 
Canadian War Museum planners 
crafted an interpretative scenario 
that emphasized the military as a 
national symbol and the importance 
of war and conflict in the shaping of 
Canada and Canadians. A striking 
architectural design followed, and a 
renewed war museum opened in May 
2005.  A flood of visitors came, and 
they have continued to come. Public 
prominence has brought applause 
and controversy as a buried military 
identity is refolded into the nationalist 
narratives of Canada.
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in which to do so.” So read the 
guideline for the competition to 
choose the monument’s sculptor.6 
The monument was unveiled in 
1992, very near the National Gallery 
and the Canadian War Museum and 
pointing directly at Parliament Hill.
 At the same time, however, 
a Canadian military identity that 
stood apart from peacekeeping 
was beginning to reassert itself. 
The celebrations of the fiftieth 
anniversaries of the last years of 
the Second World War brought its 
diminishing numbers of veterans 
to the fore. They and their lobby 
groups in turn took a notable role 
in promoting their causes and 
defending themselves against 
revisionist history that questioned 
their actions and sometimes their 
integrity.7 Remembrance Day on 11 
November, the date that the First 
World War had ended, attracted 
more attention and more participants 
and spectators. Late in the 1990s 
a popular Bell Canada television 
commercial played repeatedly before 
and on 11 November; it featured a 
contemporary young man’s telephone 
call home from a Second World War 
battlefield in France thanking his 
grandfather for his military service. 
In May 2000 Canada’s Unknown 
Soldier was brought from France 
and interred at the National War 
Memorial in the centre of Ottawa, in 
front of 20,000 observers and millions 
more on television.
 After years of neglect, veterans 
and veterans’ issues were being 
integrated into ideas of what it 
meant to be Canadian. A Veterans 
Memorial Highway sprung up on 
the road leading away from Ottawa 
towards the United States, and a 
parade of other memorials, coins, 
stamps, advertisements, and tributes 
marched into the cultural content of 
Canadian identity. The vets became 
“imbedded in a powerful narrative of 
sacrifice, honour and nationhood.”8 
 When the Cold War ended, the 
Canadian Forces found themselves 
challenged to justify 
their existence on 
the one hand and 
y e t  b u s i e r  t h a n 
ever on the other 
hand. Peace support 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s 
a b o u n d e d ,  a n d 
O t t a w a  s e l d o m 
refused international 
requests, but the 
trend as the last 
d e c a d e  o f  t h e 
century dwindled 
away was toward 
enforcement and 
combat operations 
of the type Canada 
c a r r i e d  o u t  i n 
t h e  B a l k a n s .  I n 
2002, the country 
w e n t  t o  w a r  i n 
Afghanistan, where 
it fights still. An outspoken general, 
Chief of the Defence Staff Rick 
Hillier, championed the war effort, 
downgraded peacekeeping, and 
forged a populist link between the 
military and the people. Politicians, 
who had already begun to respond to 
the increasing calls for more defence 
spending, incorporated military 
themes and support for the Canadian 
Forces into their rhetoric. Canadian 
governments under Paul Martin and 
Stephen Harper, the first a Liberal 
and the other a Conservative, agreed 
that a robust military engagement 
with the world was indispensable 
to Canada’s national security and 
international standing. The public 
seemed to take the same view.9 
 The war museum had meanwhile 
stumbled into the 1990s.10 Its building 
had a prominent address at 330 
Sussex Street, beside the Royal 
Canadian Mint and not far from 
the residences of the prime minister 
and governor general. However, 
the structure, the former national 
archives, was unsuited to the needs 
of a museum. The inadequacies, in 
the words of war museum historian 
Cameron Pulsifer, who had to live 
with them, were manifold, ranging 
from “awkward and cramped exhibit 
space, environmental conditions 
which were hazardous to artifacts, 
the lack of a freight elevator, floor 
loading capacities that could not 
support heavy artifacts, and lack 
of space for educational and other 
public activities.”11 Moreover, the 
war museum was dwarfed by a new 
next door neighbour, the Moshe 
Safdie designed National Gallery 
of Canada, which spilled onto the 
museum’s property. Next to the 
gallery’s imposing modern glass 
structure, the Canadian War Museum 
looked more ancient and threadbare 
than ever. 
The repatriation of Canada’s unknown soldier in May 2000 capped a 
decade of growing interest in Canada’s military identity.
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 The 1991 report of a Task Force on 
Military History Museum Collections 
in Canada damned the museum as 
an “embarrassment” and a “national 
disgrace.”12 The report concluded 
that contemporary museum design 
and technology had far outpaced the 
Canadian War Museum’s practices, 
while the research function, on which 
an historical museum depended, was 
completely inadequate. Well covered 
in the media, the report demanded 
better resources for the museum 
and suggested that it would be 
better off as an independent agency, 
separate from its parent institution, 
the Canadian Museum of Civilization 
Corporation (CMCC). The CMCC 
responded to the criticisms with 
$1.7 million for the war museum’s 
exhibits. A contract was then awarded 
to the Toronto architect A. J. Diamond 
for the design of an extension to 330 
Sussex that would make use of the 
space in front of the building, which 
was set well back from the street. 
 Further government help for 
the war museum was not in the 
immediate offing.  Spendthrift 
Canadian  governments ,  over 
decades, had run up a mountain 
of debt and deficits that were no 
longer sustainable. Budget cuts 
were expected for every federal 
institution, and they were ruthlessly 
implemented by a Liberal government 
elected in the fall of 1993. Officials at 
the Museum of Civilization and the 
war museum began to cast around 
for ways to attract financial support 
and sponsorships. The Friends of the 
Canadian War Museum, a volunteer 
group of museum supporters, 
announced in 1995, fifty years to 
the day after the end of the Second 
World War in Europe, that they 
would spearhead a major fundraising 
effort. “Passing the Torch,” the 
campaign was called, to convey the 
responsibility of Canadians to carry 
forth the work of earlier generations. 
 Passing the Torch set out to 
assist the museum with its plans to 
modernize 330 Sussex. In its initial 
phase, as revealed in internal war 
museum documentation, the drive 
to raise money looked to “critical 
national and ethnic groups as an 
important source of funding that will 
prove crucial to the ultimate success 
of the campaign.”13 Prime targets 
were wealthy Jewish and Dutch 
veterans, with the eventual goal of 
raising $2 million from each group. 
A Netherlands Memorial Theatre 
was contemplated, to highlight 
The original Canadian War Museum on Sussex Drive (here photographed in 1967) enjoyed a prominent location in 
Ottawa (note the Parliament Buildings in the background) but the building itself was unsuitable for a national museum.
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Canada’s role in the liberation of 
Holland in 1944-1945. So too was 
a gallery concentrated on Jewish 
Canadian war heroes. Since contacts 
with Jewish Canadians revealed their 
interest in integrating a remembrance 
of the Holocaust into the refurbished 
war museum, that became part of the 
planning as well. 
 Recognizing the opportunity 
to graft these proposals onto their 
dreams of transforming the Canadian 
War Museum into a major facility, 
the director and CEO of the Museum 
of Civilization, George MacDonald, 
and senior war museum officials 
picked up on the possibilities. In 
mid-1995 MacDonald approached the 
Bronfman Foundation, the Montreal-
based philanthropic organization, to 
ask that it help underwrite a Jewish 
gallery. He was aware, however, 
of the pitfalls of raising issues of 
cultural and religious sensitivity. 
The gallery would not pivot around 
the Holocaust. Charles Bronfman, 
the foundation’s key figure, agreed 
with MacDonald. Bronfman was 
reportedly “more interested in 
celebrating Jewish achievement 
than in reviewing past historical 
injustices.”14
 These views did not carry the day 
for long. Over 1996 and into 1997, the 
scheme to honour Jewish Canadians 
transmogrified into a vision of a 
gallery that had the Holocaust as its 
only subject. When planning began, 
the Holocaust Gallery was expected to 
cover 2,000 square feet. That number 
ballooned to 2,500 and then 4,000 
square feet, and finally was projected 
to come in at 6,000 square feet, which 
would have made it the largest 
gallery in the war museum by a factor 
of four. George MacDonald declared 
the creation of a Holocaust Gallery 
a major corporate priority of the 
Museum of Civilization Corporation. 
Victor Suthren, the director of the war 
museum, embraced the concept and 
pushed it forward. Charles Bronfman 
and his foundation were nowhere to 
be seen, but other prominent Jewish 
Canadians took up the cause. One of 
them was the historian Irving Abella, 
an expert on Canada and the Jews of 
Europe in the 1930s and 1940s. 
 It is easier to chart the upward 
trajectory of the Holocaust Gallery 
than to explain quite how and why 
the project acquired a dominant 
place in museum thinking. The 
fundrais ing potential  loomed 
large, without doubt, the more so 
because a survey of visitors to the 
museum had demonstrated interest 
in the Holocaust. The appeal and 
success of the Holocaust Museum in 
Washington also invited imitation; 
Suthren was energized by a visit there 
in March 1996. At that stage the plan 
was still to feature the war service 
of Jewish Canadians in what was 
then being called the “Holocaust and 
Jewish War Veterans Gallery.” That 
idea was jettisoned by year’s end, 
however, the reasoning being that a 
gallery given over to one identifiable 
grouping would fuel the expectations 
of other groups. There would be no 
stopping the demands for further 
galleries. A war museum document 
concluded that “a collection of little 
such galleries would destroy the 
integrity of our current and planned 
exhibits and galleries.”15 
 The war museum was right 
to refuse to cut up its mandate 
and share it with outside interests. 
Yet it was wrong to think that a 
Holocaust Gallery would be free of 
external constraints. Suthren and his 
allies, moreover, hatched the idea 
of using the Holocaust “as a means 
of addressing intolerance, prejudice 
and the dehumanizing of other ethnic 
groups which lie behind not only past 
wars but current issues such as ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ in Yugoslavia, Rwandan 
atrocities, and many other problems 
which Canadian peacekeepers are 
called on to address.” The swing 
in emphasis was in line, Suthren 
maintained, “with the museum’s 
increasing focus on the origins of 
human conflict in general as opposed 
to a mere chronicling of the military 
past.”16 The museum was moving 
away from its moorings and on 
to dangerous ground. It would be 
vulnerable to every spasm in the 
body politic and every imaginable 
charge of ethnic bias.
 Holocaust Gallery committees 
and opinions, expert and not, 
proliferated.  Crit ics emerged, 
notably history professor Robert 
Bothwell, a member of the Museum 
of Civilization Corporation Board 
of Trustees, and his University of 
Toronto colleague, Michael Marrus, 
an authority on the Holocaust. 
They counselled caution, citing the 
inadequate research capacity of the 
museum, and the sheer scope and 
complexity of the Holocaust itself. 
The presentation of the Holocaust 
catastrophe, Marrus pointed out in 
a memorandum of April 1997, “is a 
particularly formidable challenge. It 
is all the more difficult because debate 
on many issues continues, because 
some areas remain contentious, and 
because responsible people differ 
considerably in their emphases 
and interpretations. As often with 
historical subjects, while historians 
debate, the more public search 
for meaning sometimes fluctuates 
strongly. Different communities and 
different generations draw different 
lessons and significance from the 
Holocaust.”17
 M a c D o n a l d  t o o k  t h e s e 
arguments very seriously, as was 
his responsibility. He drew away 
from Suthren, his subordinate in the 
chain of command. When Suthren 
demanded a vote of confidence from 
MacDonald, it was not forthcoming. 
The two men parted company, 
Suthren’s tenure at the war museum 
ending in early October 1997.
 Suthren had not survived, but 
the Holocaust Gallery did. The A. 
J. Diamond architectural plan was 
made public in mid-November 1997. 
At a cost of $12 million, Diamond 
proposed three substantial additions 
to 330 Sussex, including a glass dome 
that would cover the courtyard in 
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front of the building, extending it out 
to the street. The revolutionized war 
museum would have much enhanced 
exhibit space, a Memorial Chamber, 
a theatre, and room to display some 
of the war art collection that was the 
museum’s hidden treasure. None 
of these welcome changes caught 
much interest. What did was a 6,000 
square foot gallery exclusively set 
aside to describe and remember the 
Holocaust.
 The formal announcement that 
the Holocaust would be a prominent 
aspect of a revamped museum 
mobilized Canada’s veterans, who 
were quick to point out that they 
had not been consulted about the 
decision and had felt marginalized 
by war museum management over 
many years. They set out to defeat 
the idea, arguing that the Holocaust 
was a horrible part of history, but not 
part of Canada’s history, and more 
particularly not part of Canada’s 
military history. Their story had 
been hijacked by someone else’s 
story. At the helm of the opposition 
campaign was Clifford Chadderton, 
the savvy president of the National 
Council of Veterans Associations, 
a longtime Ottawa lobbyist who 
knew his way around the media. 
George MacDonald fought back as 
best he could, but he was no match 
for Chadderton and other veterans’ 
groups, whose publicity machines 
ensured widespread coverage of the 
vets’ point of view.
 Politicians, sniffing publicity, 
involved themselves. A parliamentary 
committee, the Senate Subcommittee 
on Veterans Affairs, summoned 
MacDonald and the chair of the 
Board of Trustees of the Museum of 
Civilization Corporation, Adrienne 
Clarkson,  to  hearings  on the 
Holocaust Gallery issue in early 
1998. They, and Clarkson especially, 
encountered fierce antagonism from 
committee members, and from the 
veterans and other opponents of the 
gallery who populated the hearings. 
The committee’s mind was made up. 
The Holocaust Gallery was a travesty. 
Clarkson and MacDonald were 
scarcely allowed to speak. Utterly 
defeated, they announced that the 
gallery would have to go.18 
 The salvation of the war museum 
had come disguised as a crisis. The 
Holocaust Gallery debacle brought 
the parlous condition of the museum 
to national attention and cleared the 
way for the dynamic leadership and 
ideas that resulted in an innovative 
new building with a clear if complex 
message about the Canadian military 
identity.
 The government had already 
moved to still the commotion, and 
give direction to the war museum, 
after Suthren’s departure. The 
previous autumn, minister  of 
Canadian heritage Sheila Copps, 
whose responsibilities included 
the national museums, named 
Barney Danson to the Museum of 
Civilization’s Board of Trustees 
and to a war museum advisory 
committee, which he would head and 
which would give a voice to veterans 
and scholars alike.19 Danson was a 
well-connected politician from the 
party in power, a former minister 
of national defence, and a Jewish 
veteran who had been wounded in 
the Second World War. He could 
speak to both sides of the Holocaust 
debate, and he had the political clout 
to manoeuvre his powerful friends 
into action. 
 Danson wanted the Holocaust 
remembered, but not in the war 
museum. The modest A. J. Diamond 
extension to the war museum ought 
to be reserved completely for the 
museum’s own collection, most of 
which was in precarious storage 
at Vimy House, an old streetcar 
barn visited from time to time by 
flooding. The Danson committee 
concluded, in fact, that the Diamond 
plan did not go nearly far enough. 
The war museum needed a fresh 
start in a new building, and in the 
meantime, it needed the intellectual 
respectability that had been missing 
from the Suthren era, when elaborate 
re-enactments of historical events 
passed for scholarly substance. 
Danson recruited J. L. Granatstein, 
the country’s best known historian, 
as the museum’s director and chief 
executive officer for a two year term.20 
 The Granatste in  goal  was 
excellence, energetically delivered, 
and he shook the antiquated museum 
to its roots. He extracted more money 
to add to the tiny museum budget, 
oversaw the correction of hundreds 
of errors in exhibits, set up a Centre 
of Military History and a publishing 
program, restored relations with 
Canada’s military museums and 
the Canadian Forces, and squeezed 
more autonomy from the Museum 
of Civilization. Most important of all, 
and as a condition of his employment, 
Granatstein hired three established 
military historians: Roger Sarty, Dean 
Oliver, and Serge Durflinger.21 
 The museum’s research team, 
now led by Sarty and Oliver, 
developed a uniform vision for the 
future, which they housed in the 
interpretative scenario, an evolving 
document that was tested across the 
country and before various publics. 
It was driven by the story line of 
Canada’s military experiences, and 
the belief that the country’s history 
had been formed by them. Everything 
in the museum from the organization 
chart through collections policy and 
exhibit development flowed from 
the interpretative scenario, tracking 
Granatstein’s straightforward view 
that the war museum must “be 
research-based, chronological, and 
historically accurate,” or it was 
nothing. Intellectual integrity had 
to be at the gut of any reputable 
museum.22 
 Within a month of Granatstein’s 
arrival at the war museum to take 
up his duties in July of 1998, the 
plan for the Diamond expansion of 
330 Sussex was on hold. Danson, 
with his extensive contacts, had 
been at work. He managed to secure 
an ample parcel of property near 
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the National Aviation Museum on 
the Ottawa River, a gift from the 
Department of National Defence, 
which was closing the Rockcliffe 
Canadian Forces Base.23 Granatstein 
promoted the cause of a Rockcliffe 
museum across the country. He 
secured a Donner Foundation grant 
to put some of the war museum’s 
13,000 art works on tour, reasoning 
that “the collection was its trump 
card with those who might not 
think battles or tanks or medals 
mattered.”24 Funding commitments 
were sought, painstakingly. Passing 
the Torch pledged $15 million, and 
the government committed $58 
million in March 2000. A new war 
museum, unimaginable just months 
before, was in view. 
 There was one last twist in the 
renewal of the Canadian War Museum. 
Danson and Granatstein were elated 
by the 35 acre Rockcliffe plot, which 
had plenty of space for outdoor 
displays, ceremonies, parking, and 
picnicking. The project was well 
advanced when Prime Minister 
Jean Chrétien intervened to change 
the site to the more central location 
of LeBreton Flats, a short distance 
from the National War Memorial 
and the Parliament Buildings. The 
LeBreton area had been rejected 
early on in the planning because 
the ground was full of pollutants, 
the legacy of heavy industrial use 
decades before. The prime minister 
had the problem solved forthwith; 
the contamination was removed.25 
Briefly an architecture student before 
he became a lawyer, Chrétien took 
a special interest and pride in the 
creation of a grand building that 
he believed, as the New York Times 
later reported, would celebrate the 
national capital as a place that stood 
for something more than and beyond 
politics.26
 The architects chosen for the 
war museum project, on the basis of 
their response to the interpretative 
scenario document, were Raymond 
Moriyama and Alexander Rankin, 
backed by large teams from their 
respective firms. The museum’s 
research group assembled historical 
images that captured the storyline 
in visual terms for the architects’ 
use, while Moriyama and Rankin 
crossed the country, coming to poetic 
conclusions about Canada’s character 
and diversity. As a young boy, 
Moriyama and his family had been 
among the thousands of Canadian 
Japanese who were removed from 
their homes and relocated to camps 
during the Second World War; 
Rankin was from Northern Ireland, a 
land torn apart by sectarian violence. 
Both were convinced that modern 
Canada was very different from 
what they had known. Moriyama 
recalled that in his consultations 
with Canadians he found history’s 
wounds in abundance, “and yet all the 
speakers shared a wish for a brighter 
future of inclusion and hope.” He 
bound the theme of regeneration into 
his museum design, and manipulated 
the building on a gentle rise towards 
the Peace Tower of the Parliament 
Buildings, in a silent salute to “the 
symbolic home of all Canadians.”27
 M o r i y a m a  a n d  R a n k i n 
exploited the natural contours of 
Canadian geography and historical 
development. The museum seemed, 
deliberately, to be more landscape 
than architecture. Staying low and 
hugging the ground, it resembled a 
traveller hunkered down to brave a 
stiff prairie wind. It reached out from 
Ontario to the hills of Quebec on the 
western side of the LeBreton site, and 
to the east toward central Ottawa 
and Parliament, the vertical wedge 
of Regeneration Hall mimicking an 
Arctic whale, or the Rocky Mountains, 
or Canada itself as it moved on a 
steady upward climb from colony 
to country. Canada and its people, 
Rankin was convinced, were “quiet, 
modest, and strong,” just as their 
museum would be.28 
 The museum’s architecture 
got at war through the use of tilted 
planes and rough hewn materials, 
creating an impression of trauma 
and disequilibrium. On the exterior 
Moriyama created the effect of war 
visited on the land. On the inside 
he sought the intensity of an urban 
landscape scarred by battle: “Walls 
emerge sharp and unrefined from 
the floors at jagged angles. Concrete 
is left raw and exposed. Joints of 
Left & right: The new Canadian 
War Museum located on the 
LeBreton Flats opened in May 
2005.
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forms are rough.” The contractors 
for the building were instructed to 
achieve “a controlled imperfection.”29 
Novelist Alan Cumyn’s first visit 
to the museum revealed an almost 
omnipresent “grey, unadorned 
concrete angled back as if to deflect 
the shock of explosions, and cut only 
with narrow slit windows.” He felt 
“off-balance and uncomfortable, 
in keeping with the jarring and 
fractured nature of war.”30
 Veterans liked almost all of what 
they saw in the striking new museum, 
but not everything, and they had been 
conditioned to believe that what they 
did not like was not acceptable. The 
Holocaust Gallery experience had 
raised expectations that they would 
have a permanent role in deciding 
how the future museum would look 
and what it would include and omit, 
a belief that was reinforced by the 
museum’s mandate to be a place 
of remembrance as well as a war 
museum. 
 When the museum opened, 
the veterans were immediately 
unhappy about artistic renderings 
of a photograph that showed a 
Canadian soldier holding a baton to 
the throat of a Somali teenager, who 
subsequently died of his wounds. 
Their complaints, however, were 
muted, and to little effect, in part 
because no one could dispute that 
the terrible event had taken place. It 
had been photographed. It was real 
and shameful. It was part of Canada’s 
past. The regiment involved had 
been disbanded. The president of 
the powerful veterans interest group, 
the Royal Canadian Legion, was 
prepared to let the matter pass.31
 A more serious attack on the 
war museum’s integrity came when 
veterans, although not all veterans, 
condemned the interpretation of the 
Second World War allied bombing 
of Germany, in which some 20,000 
Canadian airmen participated 
and half of that number died. The 
controversy centred on a concluding 
panel containing two stark assertions: 
that the value and morality of strategic 
bombing remained bitterly contested, 
and that the bomber offensive had 
been largely ineffective until late in 
the war.32 Accompanying the words 
were photographs of the destructive 
impact of the bombing on German 
cities and civilians. The war museum 
had consulted with the veterans as 
the Second World War gallery was 
being developed. Changes were 
made, including information about 
the extent to which enemy resources 
were tied down by the bomber 
offensive, but the offending panel 
and the graphic photos remained.33 
 Again the veterans mounted a 
withering attack, and again the Senate 
Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs 
implicated itself, with similar impacts 
and similar results. Prominent in the 
veterans’ charge was Paul Manson, a 
Cold War pilot, former Chief of the 
Defence Staff, and the person who had 
led Passing the Torch’s fundraising 
for the new museum. The veterans 
and their interest groups insisted 
that the bombing had been crucial in 
bringing Hitler to his knees, and that 
the war museum was accusing the air 
veterans of immorality at best and 
criminality at worst. War museum 
officials testified at the committee 
hearings, saying that they were 
making no value judgements about 
the airmen; they pointed out that 
the exhibit as a whole demonstrated 
Canadian heroism and sacrifice, 
and contextualized the bombing 
campaign in a manner sympathetic to 
the allied side. Professional historians 
weighed in on the debate, but they 
were of differing views.34 
 The senators were not. The 
museum was “technically and 
professionally correct in its stand,” 
the subcommittee reported, but the 
vets had been insulted and should 
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be given their due. The panel ought 
to be revisited and revised.35 The 
Board of Trustees of the Museum 
of Civilization Corporation agreed 
to do so, and the director of the war 
museum, Joe Guerts, was forced 
out in the bargain. The panel was 
reworked by senior representatives 
of the CMCC and the war museum, 
and discussed with the veterans 
and David Bashow, an historian 
favourable to the vets’ interpretation. 
 It was history by committee. The 
new text was three times as long as 
the discarded panel and many times 
less direct. Glossed over were salient 
facts, notably that the bombing 
campaign in which the Canadians 
were involved (with no share in 
decision making) was explicitly 
designed to destroy Germany’s 
cities and kill civilians.36 Shades 
of the Smithsonian Institution’s 
capitulation in 1995, the critics of 
the decision shouted, when protests 
erupted and a director’s head had 
rolled over an exhibit featuring 
the Enola Gay, the airplane that 
had dropped an atomic bomb on 
Japan forty years before.37 The war 
museum, however, could draw on 
a great deal of media, academic, 
and public support – and on its own 
expert staff. It had not withdrawn 
the exhibit as the Smithsonian had, 
the photographs accompanying the 
panel were not altered or abandoned, 
and the museum insisted on historical 
accuracy in the rewriting of the 
Bomber Command panel. 
 The Canadian War Museum 
was a witness to, participant in, and 
beneficiary of a significant shift in 
the country’s socio-political culture. 
The engagement and prominence of 
the vets were part of the story, but 
only part. In the short time since 
the opening of the museum in 2005, 
well over two million visitors have 
come to a hall of history and memory 
that emphasizes the military as a 
national symbol, and the importance 
of war and conflict in the making 
of Canada and Canadians. The 
building’s architects did not shy 
away from the horrors of war, but 
they shared the commonplace conceit 
of Canadians that they have fought 
wars and sacrificed lives for the right 
reasons, not for gain or glory. The 
museum’s unflinching portrayals 
of conflict, suffering, and death are 
lashed to lofty messages of peace, 
hope, and rebirth. A military people 
perhaps, but if so, a people with a 
particular way of war. 
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an important disjunction between 
the veterans of the French Canadian 
22nd Battalion who celebrated 
their comradeship in arms in a 
sacred cause, and the increasingly 
predominant nationaliste view that 
the war was a British one of no 
interest to true Canadians. When 
Geoff presented his results at the 
military history colloquy at Laurier 
last spring, members of the audience 
encouraged him to produce the article 
published here, and the anonymous 
peer reviewers have been equally 
positive.
 Regular contributor Laura 
Brandon of the Canadian War 
Museum examines printmaking 
and other reproduction of works 
in the war art programs of the two 
world wars. In the First World War, 
the art program was organized by 
Lord Beaverbrook as something 
like a private enterprise, and the 
reproductions were sold on a 
commercial basis to raise funds. By 
contrast, the government sponsored 
the Second World War program, and 
the wide distribution of reproductions 
reveals some of the reasons for official 
support, including the value of the 
art for propaganda posters. Perhaps 
more important was a conviction 
that art should be encouraged for 
the benefit of Canadian society and 
culture, an idea that in part can 
be traced to government funding 
of art projects in the United States 
during the Depression as part of the 
Roosevelt administration’s “New 
Deal” for economic recovery.
 Sean Maloney, another regular, 
presents a first-person account of 
a Canadian-Afghan operation in 
August 2008 built around Canada’s 
capable armoured forces. These have 
proved invaluable in the broken, 
constricted, heavily overgrown 
terrain that features in key parts 
of Kandahar province. In the early 
part of this piece the doubts about 
the continued value of  heavy 
armour expressed so vehemently 
in the recent past are answered by a 
chilling account of a light armoured 
vehicle’s instant destruction, with 
heavy casualties to the crew, by 
an improvised explosive device. It 
brought to mind a talk by General 
Hillier in 2004 when he explained that 
in the Afghan environment, one really 
needed the protection and precision 
punch of a tank to “reach out and 
touch someone” – and not least to do 
so with minimum losses both to our 
personnel and noncombatants.
 This issue has two special 
features, both cinematic. Tim Cook 
of the Canadian War Museum has 
cavassed ten colleagues for their ten 
favourite war films. As interesting 
as the diversity of the movies chosen 
is the commentary by each of the 
historians. Wittingly or not, these 
are auto-biographical. Films, as 
much as books (and music) evoke 
powerful memories on the part 
of the viewer about when she or 
he first saw the work. Here is a 
snapshot of the markedly different 
life experiences and perspectives that 
have brought some of this country’s 
leading teachers, writers and museum 
professionals to military history. 
Tim collaborated with Christopher 
Schultz of the University of Western 
Ontario to produce the second 
feature, an analysis of the historical 
content of Paul Gross’ important 
film Passchendaele. Christopher, who 
has worked in film studies as well as 
history, and Tim, who has worked 
on many exhibits in several media 
aimed at broad audiences, are both 
well qualified to comment on the 
compromises with scholarship so 
often essential in a cultural product 
with a hefty price tag. It is worth 
noting that the $20 million budget for 
Passchendaele was roughly equal to the 
whole budget for exhibit planning, 
design and construction, including 
artifact conservation and preparation, 
for the new Canadian War Museum 
b u i l d i n g .  T h e  e x h i b i t s  w e r e continued on page 80…
From the Editor-in-Chief
… continued from page 2
Dear sir,
Arlene Doucette has been diligent in her article “From Belgium to 
Broadway” (Canadian Military History, 
Spring, 2010) in tracing the connection 
between the Watson and Massey families 
and the chain of events that may led 
the button, reportedly taken at Ypres, 
being bequeathed to the Canadian War 
Museum.
 It is unfortunate that she did not 
devote as much attention to the button 
itself, which is actually not a German 
button. A little research into heraldic 
designed to last (with maintenance 
and periodic upgrades) for about 
a generation. Thus Christopher 
and Tim’s speculation that Gross’ 
film will, with the limited funding 
available in Canada’s cultural sector, 
likely have to stand for a generation 
or more seems exactly correct from 
the financial perspective.
 
Roger Sarty
August 2010
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